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Abstract
Contemporary American social and political discourses have integrated con-
cerns about family values into the realm of debates about the associational
life of social capital. In these discussions, theoretical and historical confusions
about the relations between family and civil society run rampant. In this
article, I first bring theoretical clarity to these social structures and the type
of relations upon which they are predicated and, second, briefly historicize
the relationships between an American idea of family and civil society. By
tracing changes in popular understandings of family and civil society, I dem-
onstrate that the modern family values movement spurns its Victorian roots
by maintaining the nostalgic language for a life and family of old built
around a Christian home, while embracing means and institutions, and
even more importantly, a form of family, which belies the nostalgia. The
family has now become an institution or association which can be sustained
through instrumental interventions; it is no longer to do with the organic
relations of sentiment remaining from some long-faded Gemeinschaft. The
family and the Christian home ideal, which were at the center of American
critiques of modernization, have ceased to be.
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RECENT AMERICAN concerns about family values have expandedinto the realm of debates about the associational life of social capi-tal.1 In these discussions, confusions about the relations between
family and civil society run rampant. Much of this new discourse errone-
ously posits that social capital reinforces community and family. The effort
to assimilate the concern for family with social capital obscures not only
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difference but outright antagonism. Over the last century, dominant con-
ceptions of family have transformed; from a site of affect to be protected
from the vagaries of the outside world, the family has become a modern,
transactional institution. I aim to disentangle confusions prevalent in this
discourse of family and social capital through a two-pronged approach:
first, to bring theoretical clarity to these social structures and the type of
relations upon which they are predicated, and, second, to briefly historicize
the relationships between an American idea of family and civil society. I
frame this discussion primarily with two important (and representative)
texts ^ one from the turn of the last century and a second from the turn of
the recent one, with some important intervening texts ^ to chart the trans-
formations in the relationship between family and civil society.
With the first text ^ Jacob Riis’s Peril and Preservation of the Home
(1903) ^ we will show the fin-de-sie' cle antagonism between family and the
associational life of civil society, which has in some circles come to be
called social capital in more recent decades. This antagonism emerged in
response to the social changes spawned by urbanization. Riis expresses the
concerns of a middle class faced with urbanizing social upheaval. His con-
cerns about disintegrating social structures and the supporting value sys-
tems crystallized around the family, of which he spoke as if it were the last
remnant of the organic bonds of community.
Carrying the then heavy photographic equipment through tenements,
beer dives, police wards and other poverty-stricken nooks, Riis gave a face
to poverty like no one before him. Illustrating his stories (with photographs
and drawings) and showing magic lantern images (a proto-slide projection)
on his cross-country treks for lecture series, he sketched poverty with
words and pictures, which gave his pleas for reform a certain vitality and
urgency. He trudged alongside a young police commissioner on raids of
crime dens, rat-infested slums and illegal liquor houses, and so immediately
drew political attention to his efforts and elicited instantaneous municipal
response. His close relationship with Commissioner Roosevelt, who later
became Governor,Vice-President and then finally President ^ thanks to an
anarchist who assassinated President McKinley ^ gave nationwide political
and popular reach to Riis’s efforts. (He was offered and declined a
Caribbean ambassadorship as thanks for his years of tireless reform efforts.)
Riis served on innumerable panels, commissions and other instruments of
reform, and his work moved from documentary description to normative
exhortation. He was influential as an essayist, journalist, lecturer and refor-
mer, and his work on metropolitan slums and social life in the city is impor-
tant in the critiques of particular forms of civil society.
The secondtext is representativeofthe recent propensity to join this anxi-
etyofthreattofamilywithanewrhetoricof loss^ thatofsocialcapital^ irrespec-
tive of the tensions between the two social structures.While the tendency to
join family anxieties with the rhetoric of declining civil society is widespread,
former senator and current candidate for the Republican presidential nomina-
tion Rick Santorum’s book It Takes a Family: Conservatism and the Common
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Good (2005a) is a particularly good example for a combination of practical and
locational reasons. First, he most clearly makes the argument that the family
and social capital are mutually reinforcing. He tells us: ‘Where social capital
has disappeared, the breakdown of the traditional family usually was a huge
factor in that calamity’ (Santorum,2005a:10). Second, heusedhisposition as a
senatorandmemberoftheRepublicanleadershiptoprovideabullypulpittopro-
mote family values in general, and to promote prominent institutions and ¢g-
ures of the family values advocacy contingent (e.g. Focus on the Family, the
Family Research Council, James Dobson andTony Perkins).2 This advocacy
extended to the broader religious conservatives’promotion of civil society, like
Marvin Olasky’s compassionate conservatism project. For instance, he gave a
famous speech later adapted as an article, ‘The Conservative Future’
(Santorum, 2005b), at the Heritage Foundation’s F|rst International
Conservative Conference on Social Justice in September 2005. After leaving
the Senate in 2007, he has continued to tirelessly work on issues of family
values as a Senior Fellowat theEthics andPublicPolicyCenter and as a regular
contributor to Fox News.Third, he self-professedly used his elected position
andposition intheSenate leadershiptofurtheragendasfoundeduponthis intel-
lectual andhistorical confusion. In short, hehas tried tomakebad social theory
thebasis ofmuddledpolicy.
By disentangling the religious right’s contribution to social discourse,
I propose to distinguish the similar diagnoses of the two movements ^
family values and social capital ^ from their contradictory recommenda-
tions. The two movements ^ family values and social capital ^ both decry a
loss of social relations, and both argue that society is better maintained,
better facilitated with stronger social relations. Thus far, they reach similar
diagnoses. However, the prescriptions are at odds. They fail to distinguish
types of social relations, they fail to see how social forms are shaped by his-
torical conditions, and they fail to see contradictions in their respective solu-
tions. The confusion arises because one movement basically identifies
modernity as the cause of social ills, while the other believes it to be their
cure. In our example from former Senator Rick Santorum, the intellectual
muddle reaches its nadir.
Questions about the relationships between family and society have
long shaped American social thought. Even so, Robert Putnam mainly
ignores de Tocqueville’s early 19th-century documenting of American associ-
ational life and charts the widespread emergence of this form of civil society
during the late 19th and early 20th century.3 Using his eponymous example
of bowling teams, the American Bowling Congress only began as an organi-
zation in the first decade of the 20th century and its meteoric rise took
place during the two middle decades of the century, peaking in the 1960s.
(The Women’s Bowling Congress started a little later, in the late 1910s.)
The rise of these associations, however, was not a lauded development at
the time; clubs and associations ^ commentators argued ^ pulled husbands
and wives, mothers and fathers, out of the home. Long before bowling
alone became a problem, bowling together was one.
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In contrast to Robert Putnam’s (2000) praise for bowling teams, early
20th-century observers of the rise of the associational life of civil society
(including bowling clubs) thought it threatened community and family life.
Putnam’s category for these social relations ^ social capital4 ^ arose from
the ruins of community, or so Progressive Era reformers like Riis would
have us think (Riis, 1903). The currently lauded associational life of the
United States was, in the ¢n-de-sie' cle period, thought to be a social ill,
because it lured people away from their family. In the waning decades of
the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, advocates of family values
have embraced civil society and social capital as panaceas for threats to the
family ^ the former threat has become the solution.
While civil society has had a brief reign as a dominant social form, its
ostensible present decline elicits mourning as if it is the passing of an eter-
nal tradition.5 A basic assumption in theorizing civil society ^ the tension
that exists between individual and society ^ often overshadows a third pole
to social tensions: that is, community, another form of collectivity.6 The
antagonism between community and civil society is not merely a categorical
problem of social structures (or forms of relationships, as we shall see).
These theoretical distinctions also correspond to historical changes in
social life, or at least changes in how social life is discussed and repre-
sented. This historicity does not merely relate to distinct manifestations of
social relations under different prevailing modes of production. Older ten-
sions or complaints were that the rise of the associational life of civil society
specifically threatened other forms of social relations ^ namely the family.
Modernization and the Family
The impacts of industrial urbanization on 19th-century social life were
transformative. Long-standing ties of people to local communities eroded
under pressures and opportunities of urbanizing capital. Large-scale domes-
tic and international migrations sent millions flocking to emerging urban
factories. Social relations which were (literally) grounded in place began to
fray, and new, more distant (and often instrumental) relations began to
replace the much older ties that bound generations to their long-standing
homes and communities. Urban commentators described this loss of com-
munity, and excoriated the city and the interest relations which were often
cultivated there.
Though later than Dickens in England, ‘realist’, fictional ruminations
on the urban poor began in the last decade of the 19th century in the work
of Stephen Crane (Maggie, a Girl of the Streets) and William Dean
Howells (A Hazard of New Fortunes). These were paralleled by the rise of
documentary, muckraking journalism by figures like Jacob Riis, who in
1890 published How the Other Half Lives (1997), drawing upon his journal-
istic work for the Tribune and the Evening Sun, as well as longer pieces for
magazines like Scribner’s. This work is the first of those relating to his
broader normative project on home and family, which he elaborates further
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in other works like The Making of an American (1925),The Battle with the
Slum (1998), The Children of the Poor (1970) and his The Peril and
Preservation of the Home (1903). How the Other Half Lives was enormously
popular ^ eleven editions in five years (Szasz and Bogardus, 1974: 422); its
success far exceeded Riis’s expectations and it had far more impact than ear-
lier works of critique of the newly industrializing cities. He became one of
the most prominent spokespersons for social reform.
Riis’s broader project focuses on preserving a social order grounded in
the middle-class family and legitimated by religion. Essentially ^ like most
Progressive Era reformers ^ he wants to transform the poor into the
imago burgensis. He wants a full-scale adaptation of the style of life without
addressing any underlying economic conditions. This mimetic transforma-
tion, of course, cannot produce exact replicas; the poor cannot actually
afford the lifestyle. Nonetheless, the reformers’ hopes are that the finan-
cially underprivileged can at least comport themselves with a more genteel
air and, most importantly, adapt their family norms. The transformations
necessary for this plan are three-fold: a change in the physical structure of
the city to create the community, or public, space for home; transforming
urban property to produce spaces conducive to family through laws banning
certain housing structures, making windows, airshafts, etc. mandatory,
that is, creating the domestic, or private, space for home; and, finally, a
change in the consciousness of the poor.
While the former two ideally would have included a full-fledged, state-
sponsored Haussmannization of New York,7 Riis realizes that he is no
longer in Europe. He will have to rely on the markets to adapt the municipal
infrastructure gradually. ‘Business, in a wider sense, has done more than
all other agencies together to wipe out the worst tenements. It has been
New York’s real Napoleon III, from whose decree there was no appeal’
(Riis, 1997: 201). (Riis would have envied the public/private partnership
which restructured New York City a century later to make Times Square
‘family-friendly’ by displacing the indigent and replacing them with subur-
ban megastores.) For Riis and other ¢n-de-sie' cle reformers, business was to
provide the necessary urban changes to ensure a middle-class public
defended from the urban poor.
The goal of Haussmann and Riis was, of course, a bourgeois self-pre-
servation; Walter Benjamin has pointed out that ‘The true goal of
Haussmann’s projects was to secure the city against civil war’ (1999: 12).8
Likewise, Riis worried tremendously about the threats to the city and the
potential for violence against property ^ hence his frequent, worried invoca-
tion of the Draft Riot, Tompkins Square Riot, Chicago’s Haymarket Riot
and the Paris Commune.
Thus, Riis’s introduction to How the Other Half Lives includes
excerpts from a report on the 1863 Draft Riots which concluded that:
‘When the great riot occurred in 1863 . . . every hiding-place and nursery of
crime discovered itself by immediate and active participation in the
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operations of the mob.Those very places and domiciles, and all that are like
them, are to-day nurseries of crime, and of the vices and disorderly courses
which lead to crime. By far the largest part ^ eighty per cent. at least ^ of
crimes against property and against the person are perpetrated by individ-
uals who have either lost connection with home life, or never had any, or
whose homes had ceased to be sufficiently separate, decent, and desirable
to afford what are regarded as ordinary wholesome influences of home
and family.. . . The younger criminals seem to come almost exclusively
from the worst tenement house districts, that is, when traced back to the
very places where they had their homes in the city here.’ Of one thing New
York made sure at that early stage of the inquiry: the boundary line of the
Other Half lies through the tenements. (Riis, 1997: 5, his emphasis)
The fear of this urban explosion informs the need to know the Other Half;
reform is a result of fear.9 This Manichean split between darkness and
light ^ ‘I hate darkness and dirt anywhere, and naturally want to let in the
light’ ^ frames Riis’s analysis. His concern for the Other Half is how to
bring it into the light to best preserve property and family. To maintain the
necessary social stability to enable the continuance of the current economic
system, Riis advocated not only changing building codes and zoning laws;
he was willing to allow real estate profit margins to decrease somewhat
while maintaining the structure of investments in property.10
The violent potential of the Other Half, as we saw above, was the pri-
mary motivation for his concern with social ills. For Riis, the Other Half
is a chaos to be tamed, a disorder to be ordered. Riis, like many other refor-
mers of the time, is a prophet of order;11 he clings to the venerable social
watchwords, ‘property, family, religion, order’.12 The poverty, slums and suf-
fering of the city follow from uncontrolled growth with its ‘consequent disor-
der and crowding’ (Riis, 1997: 146). Like Napoleon III, he seeks a new way
to order the city.
Riis adopts a popular ideal of domestic Protestantism to form a con-
stellation of these first three social watchwords as a model for the fourth.
His many books and lectures focus on addressing the modern city to pre-
serve a social order based on property and family legitimated by religion.
Riis and the Christian Home
In one of these books diagnosing the ills of urban life ^ originally given as a
seminary lecture series ^ Riis tells his contemporaries that because the
modern family does not spend enough time together, neighborhood life has
collapsed. The culprit in this violence to the community: the rise of clubs
and bowling. The time spent networking was time after one’s workday;
these clubs drew men and women out of the home.13 And the home here
was the popular Victorian ideal of the Christian home.
This particularly Protestant articulation of home became the locus for
the formation of moral citizens and pious Christians;14 it was a sacred space,
forming a bulwark to insulate the Victorian family from the ravages of
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modern life and supposed threats from proletarian immigrants.The Christian
home ideal not only furnished patriotic and ethical training but also:
provided a means of blessing middle-class values and norms. Domestic
Protestantism was not merely an individualized form of popular piety. The
ideology promoted by secular and clerical writers helped to justify middle-
class notions of gender, economics and taste by presenting the Victorian
home as eternal and God-given. (McDannell, 1992: 173)
As the God-given ideal for social life, the Christian home legitimated the
family and defended it against the perils of modernization.
This popular idea of a Christian home requires a spatial arrangement
for a family order. An ideal of rural or small-town life, which fin-de-sie' cle
commentators thought to be the proper social and spatial formation to
foster the Christian home, requires both kinship relations and relationship
to place. In the fin-de-sie' cle period, new zoning laws started to limit the
numbers and relations of those who could live in the same residence by fore-
closing options like multiple boarders or even older extended-family domes-
tic arrangements. The spatial arrangements carved up private space to
promote the formation of what, by the middle of the 20th century, comes
to be called the nuclear family. The family does not go nuclear until after
the bomb, but the movement towards this category is already under way in
broader sociological work.15
The influence of a family in a proper Christian home provided the
greatest reach of the gospel into society. To order the city, a proper sense of
domestic space, relationships, and habits had to be instilled into the urban
poor. The Christian home became an ideal of how family life was to be
structured. But then this ideal became an instrument of ordering; if home
life could be restored to the city, its influence might spread.
In his The Peril and the Preservation of the Home, Riis identifies ‘the
weak spot, in your campaign for the home ^ that home which all the influ-
ences of the modern day combine to put in peril. I mean the disappearance
of the family altar’ (1903: 49^50).Two important points emerge in this diag-
nosis. First, the home is under threat from modern life. He continues to
elaborate on this point by delineating some of the causes of the destruction
of the home.16 But Riis’s second point about the family altar is a quite
intriguing invocation of the Genesis story of Cain.17 While the notion of
the ‘family altar’ may evoke a 1950s Ozzie and Harriet household with
Bible readings around the dinner table, the altar was initially a place for
the violent slaughtering of an animal (Cain’s bloodless offering ^ of crops
from his fields ^ was unacceptable). While Cain ^ as the first murderer ^
is an image that distils distinct fears or threats to society, for Riis, Cain
represents something more. Over nearly a decade and a half, Riis’s works
continually invoke the Cain story ^ in How the Other Half Lives, his con-
tribution to My Brother and I (Riis, 1895), and in the 1903 The Peril and
the Preservation of the Home. Riis returns to the Cain story again and
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again to represent a range of threats to family norms; the story is used to
symbolize anxieties about domestic arrangements, moral laxity and laziness,
especially among the urban poor. For Riis, the responsibility to be a broth-
er’s keeper ^ also from the same Cain story ^ involves molding the poor in
the image of the middle class. The Genesis story, thus, informs both the
former (peril) and latter (preservation) formulations.
The family altar (and hearth) become a metonym for family, and civil
society organizations and clubs are thought to threaten the family and its
symbols. Riis writes:
In the town of which I spoke, there have in the last half dozen years grown
up two clubs, one for the men, the other for the women, and I am told that
practically they all belong. The result has been the disappearance of pretty
nearly all of the pleasant neighborhood life of that day when a man gave
his arm to his wife after supper and they went together for a social call
upon some neighbor, for a chat, a little music, going home in good season
for bed, telling one another that they had had a good time. There are no
good times in that town any more ^ not of that kind at all events. The men
spend the evenings bowling at the club; the women meet in committees to
plan public improvements. The old time supper has become a later dinner
and it is the rarest of all things to find a neighbor ‘dropping in’ unan-
nounced ^ so rare that one feels that it somehow is not good form any
longer. The family firesides are cold. And the young ^ I am told that there
is a disproportionate number of them growing up idle and useless, if not
worse. They have lost their hold, though they do not know it. I am no
enemy of clubs, although I know little of them; but, as a substitute for the
altar, I will fight them until I die. And I am a great backer of woman’s influ-
ence in public affairs ^ it has been good always and everywhere in my
sight; but I say to you now that I would rather see, we could better afford,
that every club and organization in the land should cease to exist, and
every ten-pin alley stand silent and deserted, than that the old home life
which centred about the family hearth should go from among us. With it
goes that which nothing, no commercial gain, no advance in science or gov-
ernment or human knowledge, can replace. (Riis, 1903: 52^5)
The trope of Cain becomes a carrier for all that is good for the family, as we
shall shortly see, as well as the threats to it.18 Riis’s appropriation of the
Cain story furnishes both problem and solution; the same trope, which he
deploys elsewhere for other urban threats,19 here provides a model for solv-
ing urban social problems ^ treating others as members of the family, that
is, being a brother’s keeper. The biblical overlay renders modern urban con-
ditions and their remedies as transcendental, suprahistorical concerns. The
modern American family becomes a family writ large across history and
culture; a particular form of the family becomes a transcendental structure,
not one formed by particular social and economic conditions.
In this conceptualization, the family thus transcends any social struc-
ture, which leads to confusions in how it relates to community and civil
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society. Part of the problem with the contemporary communitarian move-
ment is the failure to distinguish these two distinct types of social struc-
tures, and the frequent collapsing of the discussion of associations into the
language of community.20 At the turn of the last century, a different ques-
tion was asked: how could home and family be secure, when evenings were
spent with friends in bowling leagues, rather than around the ‘family
altar’? At the time that Robert Putnam charts the beginning of bowling
teams (2000: 440), such associations were not regarded as a sign of vibrant
civic life but as a symptom of decaying community. Social relations began
to mimic capital because capital was shaping them ^ as Marx said, social
capital is both a prerequisite for and result of production.21 The ‘organic
bonds’ were already eroding before these clubs and associations began to
emerge.The only people still sharing proximity over years were family mem-
bers. The family had to be protected. But the bowling teams, clubs and so
on pulled members out of the home and thus distended the family. With
its fall, commentators like Riis felt, the entire community fell.
Riis thought that recognizing the other as brother could rectify social
ills. For him, the mark of Cain appears because of society’s failure to recognize
that ‘I am my brother’s keeper’; he felt that the tenement’s curse ^ its mark
of Cain ^ could be lifted by the undoing of this failure. Riis tells us that:
Loving our brother, we shall not have the heart to leave him in the slough
. . . we shall be cutting off the heritage of sin and sorrow and failure that
would blight the to-morrow. We shall have lifted the curse [mark] that was
laid upon man for forgetting his brother. (1903: 174)
Creating and participating in the community are solutions for social ills,
but the first step is the recognition of the bond with the other. Riis declares
that:
I am my brother’s keeper, and I am ashamed at last not to own it.That is the
key-note of the whole modern reform movement, the new charity, the new
school, the social settlement and all; and thank God for it. (1903: 188)
He also notes: ‘‘‘My brother’’ is the word that has healing from all our social
ills’ (1903: 185). The other person had to become as a family member, not
a connection who was a mere means to an end. Riis, like his contemporaries,
feared that community structures centered around the family were collaps-
ing in the metropolis ^ thus he invoked the Cain story both to represent a
buttressing of the family and to delineate threats to it.
Community and Civil Society
While Riis and other reformers were defending family and community (or
neighborhood) life from the perils of modernity, other writers were theoriz-
ing these same social changes arising with industrial capital. Social theory
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reflections on civil society began to proliferate over the 19th and into the
early 20th century. An implicit Hegelian model of concentric relations
grounds civil society in the family; on this reading, the family must be the
root institution of society.22 The interconnected social structures are the
Hegelian series of concentric relations between the family, civil society and
the state. In this model, the broader social structures are predicated on the
preceding ones ^ each structure is the building block for the next one.
Thus, presumably, without family relations one is not interconnected to
civil society and the state. However, most associational life is not mediated
through the family ^ excepting, probably, religion; one usually joins volun-
tary clubs as an individual.These two social forms ^ family and civil society
^ come into tension because their structures are predicated on different
expectations about the nature of social relations. Figures like Riis, or
the more recent Focus on the Family or Family Research Council, presume
that families provide primary relations that are not self-interested. While
not necessarily altruistic, these relations are supposedly organic ones of
binding sentiment; they are not instrumental but ends in themselves. In
contrast, the associational life of social capital is still ultimately about pro-
ductivity. We need not turn back to Marx for this point, for Robert
Putnam’s analogy between social capital and other forms of capital makes
this explicit.
By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital ^ tools and
training that enhance individual productivity ^ the core idea of social capital
theory is that social networks have value. Just as a screwdriver (physical cap-
ital) or a college education (human capital) can increase productivity (both
individual and collective), so too social contacts affect the productivity of
individuals and groups. (2000: 18^19)
Social capital increases individual productivity.While the means^ends
distinctions between these social relations are more at the level of ideas
than empirical reality, the assumption that organic familial relations ^
rather than the transactional ones of voluntary association ^ will solve pre-
sumed social ills underlies the contradictions that we will soon confront in
the ideas of Rick Santorum.
Riis’s model of a Christian home assumes a family ideal rarely mani-
fested in history. It posits a unity of wills which supposedly arose in small
town life. In his autobiography, first published in 1901, Riis acknowledges
that for him the slum is still contrasted not with uptown homes of pluto-
crats but with the countryside.
For hating the slum what credit belongs to me? Who could love it? When it
comes to that, perhaps it was the open, the woods, the freedom of my
Danish fields I loved, the contrast that was hateful. I hate darkness and
dirt anywhere, and naturally want to let in the light. I will have no dark cor-
ners in my own cellar; it must be whitewashed clean. (1925: 272)
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I argue that his ideal is closely akin to the theoretical construct of
Gemeinschaft. Community was a presumed unity of people and place
where families had lived side by side for generations and developed relations
in which social life functioned along the lines of family relations. While
the point that Riis’s description of his childhood home in Ribe, Denmark,
resembles Ferdinand T˛nnies’ idea of community has been made elsewhere
(see Fried, 1990: 21), I am making a di¡erent point. I am arguing that
Riis is trying to create a space for home (as metonym for Gemeinschaft) in
the city. Riis wants to create small havens from a heartless world into
which people may retreat ^ he advocates more windows and parks to bring
the air and countryside into urban life.
Riis makes pragmatic concessions with regard to repairing the city for
the urban populations, unlike other reformers, including those who founded
the Children’s Aid Society or the Fresh Air Fund, which carted young
urban orphans to houses and farms away from the metropolis. Riis’s fixes
are to bring elements of the country to the city; the country is still the
ideal. Among the great achievements of reform, he cites the tearing down
of Tompkins Square ^ the site of an 1870s urban uprising and disdained
anarchist movements for ‘Bread or Blood’ by near-starving laborers ^ to be
replaced by a park. He contends that the introduction of gardens into a ten-
ement block:
does the work of a dozen police clubs. In proportion as it spreads the neigh-
borhood takes on a more orderly character. As the green dies out of the land-
scape and increases in political importance, the police find more to do.
Where it disappears altogether from sight, lapsing into a mere sentiment,
police-beats are shortened and the force patrols double at night. (1997: 124;
see also Riis, 1903: 184)
Riis recognizes that the city cannot be sent away; it has come so forcibly, it
is to remain a feature of the modern world. The family in its Christian
home becomes the last urban remnant of small-town life.
This presumption of unity and nostalgia for totality parallels the social
shifts described in Ferdinand T˛nnies’ analyses of modernization. In his
argument, the organic totality of community (Gemeinschaft) collapses
before the onslaught of this modernization, and thus social existence frag-
ments. T˛nnies’ Gemeinschaft is an association based on organic life, grow-
ing out of a familiar, comfortable and exclusive social existence. His theory
of Gemeinschaft assumes a complete unity of wills, that is, a common
sense of values, mores and culture. He writes:
[T]he theory of Gemeinschaft is based on the idea that in the original or nat-
ural state there is a complete unity of human wills. This sense of unity is
maintained even when people become separated. It takes various forms,
depending on how far the relationship between differently situated individ-
uals is predetermined and ‘given’.. . . While the seed of Gemeinschaft, or
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the bias of human minds towards it, is to be seen in any relationship of
kinsfolk, these three [relationships between a mother and her child;
between a man and a woman as a couple; and between those who recognize
each other as brothers and sisters] are of special importance as containing
the seeds which are strongest and most readily nurtured. (T˛nnies,
2001: 22)
Though beginning as a community of kinship, Gemeinschaft develops into
community of place, and subsequently emerges into community of spirit ^
the community of place binds together life on a physical level and commu-
nity of spirit holds life together on the level of consciousness. According to
T˛nnies, home is ‘both the physical location and so to speak the living
body of kinship’ and, beyond the walls of the house, wherever the spirit of
kinship is strong in relationships, one is able to feel at home (T˛nnies,
2001: 28).23
The demands and pace of modern life undermined the potential for
such a home for the family. The changes in social life brought about by
industrial urbanization had a double relationship to space ^ the displacing
of labor from longtime family homes and then reconsolidating a mass
within proximity to the locus of production.24 The city, thus, became the
locus of the displaced; they were new places teeming (or places newly teem-
ing) with populations who were all from elsewhere, and whose languages, cul-
tures and families were very different. As the site of this random
agglomeration of people, the city became juxtaposed to the ideal of small-
town family life; the city became the locus of capital, anomie or Gesellschaft.
The displacement from the small-town Gemeinschaft begins with these
modernizing changes. Social structure,T˛nnies argues, then transforms into
Gesellschaft ^ a civil society which is a purely mechanical construct.
Gesellschaft, too, begins with a group of people living alongside each other
but without being united; spheres of power and activity are divided and any
confluence of wills is merely transactional. Rather than the Gemeinschaft-
relationships of kinship and spirit founded on a bond of blood, with
Gesellschaft all relationships are replaced by abstraction. All ‘conventional
sociability may be understood as analogous to the exchange of material
goods’ (T˛nnies, 2001: 65) ^ all relations are reduced to money (or contrac-
tual) relations.W|th the separation of productive labor from private, domestic
labor and the coextensive separation of workplace from home, he argues, a
rationalizing process takes place in work practices ^ breaking processes into
constituent parts, changing administrative structures, movement of opera-
tions nearer to important markets and so on. The entire social structure
comes to exist for the sake of merchants and capitalists. These changes in
work displace people from the land; as they move to di¡erent places to sell
their labor, the tie between kinship and place is severed.
One strand of appropriation of T˛nnies in American sociology
transforms these social structures into distinct forms of relationships ^
community and civil society become sentiment and interest relations.
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This juxtaposition of family to the instrumentality of interest relations was
still a standard idea in mid-20th-century American sociology. At this
point, American sociologists regarded the nuclear family as the last bastion
of sentiment relations and a bulwark against the increasing threats of
modernity.
With Margaret MaryWood, the discursive connections which, I argue,
exist between Gemeinschaft and family, become explicit; we are no longer
restricted to our Riisian authorial-biographical read for their connections.
Her analysis relies upon Theodore Abel’s two categories of social relations:
sentiment relations and interest relations.25 Abel points out that in his
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft categories, T˛nnies was ‘the first to recog-
nize the difference between what we have termed interest and sentiment
relations’ (1930: 7).26 In her appropriations of the sentiment/interest or
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinctions in relations,Wood outlines a history
in which the expanding field of interest relations in the United States in
the first half of the 20th century coincided with the contraction in that of
sentiment relations. These, she argues, are narrowed nearly to the point of
the nuclear family. She writes:
The field of the sentiment relationships has, on the contrary, been nar-
rowed.The concept of the family, which is the great fountainhead of the sen-
timent relationships, has become more exclusive. Generally, only the more
immediate kin are now included within the family circle. The obligations of
kinship which formerly held the larger inclusive family structure together
have ceased to function except among near kin, and even here they tend to
be replaced by bonds of a different nature. (Wood, 1960: 23)
The immediate family becomes the last bastion of sentiment and emo-
tion. It is the last haven against a modern world of pure instrumentality.
However problematic this vision of the family might be, it enables the inev-
itable relation between community (Gemeinschaft) and family. The bonds
of a different nature, that is, transactional relationships, are those whose
rise Jacob Riis lamented; these outside demands drew people away from
the family altar. This separation from family, and thus any form of ties of
sentiment, is an unnatural aberration (Wood, 1960: 24). Like Riis before
her, Wood cannot imagine meaningful relations in the modern world
unless mediated through the nuclear family. In this arc from Riis toWood,
the family remains the last bastion of community against transactional,
interest relations; the family is the sole haven from the abstract relations of
civil society.
Family Values
The politicization of the family over the last two decades of the 20th century
is usually couched in terms of defining the country (see, for instance,
Hunter, 1991). The struggle to de¢ne America is much older than the
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coming of age of the baby boomers. Culture wars over the class, ethnic, and
religious con¢gurations of the nation have been with us at least since
V|ctorian responses to the city and, truthfully, even much longer than that.
For the ‘making of Americans’,27 Jacob Riis calls for hoary Protestant
values of thrift, orderliness, hygiene, hard work and dedication to family.
He combined these values with a desire for ‘small-town values’, a normative
assumption of language (English) and expectations of cultural assimilation
for the ‘other half’. For his prescription for social integration, he has received
homage from contemporary ¢gures of the religious right, such as the foun-
der of modern ‘compassionate conservatism’, Marvin Olasky (see Olasky,
1992, 2009). Riis wrote of the need to preserve the family and home three-
quarters of a century before James Dobson called for a focus on the family
or the Family Research Council gave Reagan administration o⁄cials a
forum for further politicizing the family. W|th the rise of the religious
right, the previous ¢n-de-sie' cle kulturkampf now became an issue of policy.
The culture wars spread from the way institutions function and disseminate
norms to legislative and executive actions. The tenor of the culture wars
took a new pitch.
Riis’s writings on the city represent one front in a much larger strug-
gle over American identity in response to modernization ^ to do with
proper types of individual subjects and proper social structures. The 1980s’
bubbling up of the politicization of the family provoked realignments on sev-
eral positions within the different camps involved in the culture wars.
Jacob Riis had drawn the lines clearly between the family and civil society
^ these were antagonistic social structures. Yet contemporary defenders of
family values such as Rick Santorum now contend that clubs and associa-
tions are good for the family. In a speech given at the conservative think-
tank the Heritage Foundation, then Senator Santorum took up the mantle of
Olasky’s compassionate conservatism, which was popularized by GeorgeW.
Bush in his 2000 presidential bid. Santorum wrote that: ‘Compassionate
Conservatism relies on healthy families, freedom of faith, a vibrant civil
society, a proper understanding of the individual and a focused government
to achieve noble purposes through definable objectives which offers hope
to all’ (2005b). Civil society, family, faith and the proper form of individual-
ity required a government focused on ‘noble purposes’. The cultural issues
were now the concern of the ballot box.
He locates his project within the broader contexts of compassionate
conservatism ^ the founder of which lauds Riis. Both in his monograph ^
It Takes a Family (2005a) ^ and in his presentation on the future of conser-
vatism, Santorum links the family with civil society. In his essay, he writes
that:
[C]ompassionate conservatism is founded on the family because the family
is the foundation of a healthy civil society. Families set standards and
demand that their children live up to them. Strong families are grounded
in a code of moral conduct, a shared faith, plus judicious use of the age-old
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sanctions of shame and stigma. Families teach us about the essential demo-
cratic virtue of selflessness ^ the mantra of the popular culture, ‘if it feels
good do it,’ just doesn’t wash in a family. (2005b)
Here, again, the family embodies selfless sentiment relations; it is the locus
into which we may retreat from the instrumentality of civil society’s interest
relations. And yet, the family is to be the foundation of this same civil
society.
Santorum’s project rests on the assumption that the ‘traditional
family’, that is, the bourgeois nuclear family, is the foundation of every
successful civilization (Santorum, 2005a: 7). Ignoring all anthropological or
historical evidence which might suggest the modernity of this ‘traditional’
social form, Santorum argues that there are ¢ve di¡erent types of capital
in American civil society and that ‘family breakdown ^ out-of-wedlock
births, divorce, cohabitation, and absentee parenthood ^ has depleted that
capital in recent decades’ (2005a: 9).28 Santorum (2005a: 55) creates a lib-
eral bogeyman by falling back on rather banal cliche¤ s of individual (the con-
cern of liberals) versus society (the concern of conservatives), arguing that
liberal social goals fail to recognize the bonds between individuals. My argu-
ment, however, does not fall on the false dichotomy of the individual^society
binary; rather, I contend that the structure of the social bonds between indi-
viduals matters. All bonds are not the same. The structures of community
are not the same as those of civil society. The bourgeois subject and the
ostensible Gemeinschaft-type sentiment relations found in the nuclear
family represent the proper form of individual subject and social organiza-
tion for Riis; for Santorum, the family becomes but a cog within the
machine of capital.
Santorum undertakes his discussion of social capital with a brief sum-
mary of Robert Putnam’s work Bowling Alone. Putnam describes social
capital thus:
[S]ocial capital refers to connections among individuals ^ social networks
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them . . .
‘social capital’ calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful
when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. (2000: 19)
By erecting his argument on the erroneous edifice of Putnam’s arguments,
Santorum replicates Putnam’s mistaken assimilation of communitarian rhe-
toric to the structures of civil society. By collapsing these structures,
Putnam provides Santorum with an intellectual framework that reinscribes
the individual versus society. All bonds are reduced to the instrumental
ones of civil society.
The confusions do not solely emanate from the religious right; they are
prevalent in the scholarly circles of those advocating social capital, where
one finds rhetoric of community being conflated with that of associational
life. Even beyond his book’s subtitle ^ ‘The Collapse and Revival of
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American Community’, Putnam tends to collapse the two social forms into
each other, as we have seen. For instance, Putnam tells us that:
‘Social Capital’ is to some extent merely new language for a very old debate
in American intellectual circles. Community has warred incessantly with
individualism for preeminence in our political hagiology. (2000: 24)
Or:
It is emphatically not my view that community bonds in America have
weakened steadily throughout our history ^ or even throughout the last
hundred years. On the contrary, American history carefully examined is a
story of ups and downs in civic engagement, not just downs ^ a story of col-
lapse and of renewal. (2000: 25)
In the first quote, Putnam juxtaposes the individual to society, whatever the
social structures may be; and in both, community and civil society (or
civic engagement or social capital) are used interchangeably.
Putnam wants to see an array of social relationships ^ the household
and the family, the community and social networks ^ as operating in
modes of mutual reinforcement, while Riis sees the latter turning against
the former. Writing on the impacts of urbanization in contemporary Dakar
and Johannesburg, AbdouMaliq Simone (2001) argues that the relationships
between family, communities and broader social networks turn from
mutual trust to antagonistic competition with a foreclosure of life chances.29
Riis’s analyses of tenement life document the 75 percent of the slum-dwell-
ing, urban population for whom life chances are minimal and minimizing.
He reports that the proletarianization of the new immigrants from Europe
is indeed increasing tensions and leading to competition, but he most fears
the inter-class (rather than intra-class) strains. Yet some of these intra-
class competitions are already implicit within the Riisian accounts ^ some
of them through the enforced alienation of labor.30
Compared to the turmoil of Riis’s fin-de-sie' cle city, Putnam’s golden
age of social capital (post-war America) was a period of unprecedented eco-
nomic growth, the nadir of American immigration ^ lowest levels since the
1820s ^ suburbanization and the rise of the nuclear family. In other words,
Putnam writes about a time and place of relative social stability and the
expansion of life chances; he then ahistorically assumes that the structure
of relations should be the same for all periods. (Simone makes clear the
necessity for establishing the historical and social contexts of social capital
^ a lesson which Putnam would do well to note.) Riis’s and Simone’s assess-
ments of agonism, however, reflect times/places undergoing not a mere
social change but an anomic overturning of norms,31 periods in which
shifts of the role of capital completely alter not only the basis of social repro-
duction but also threaten the ideological apparatuses that legitimate these
norms.
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Riis was trying to legitimate the (soon-to-be) nuclear family and main-
tain an economic system which created the public/private split that enabled
the formation of this family. To do so, he isolates the family from the
broader network of social relations to bracket it from any competitive social
life and thus to enable familial affiliation, trust and loyalty to flourish. He
is creating a haven safe from the associational life of social capital with the
hope of re-establishing social norms thought to flourish in rural communi-
ties. Simone (2001: 46) talks about the roles of networks in a move toward
‘normalization’ of economic management and governance in global urban
contexts. Riis, too, looks at social relations as the means for negotiating
urban industrialization to re-establish some form of norms. However, he dis-
putes the structure of those relationships. He argues for the ‘naturally
given’ form of the family.
The naturalness of the family is, of course, a figment of Riis’s (and
Santorum’s) imagination ^ it, too, is an institution formed through pro-
cesses of institutionalization. In the discursive shift from Riis’s to
Santorum’s family, the acts of institutionalization of this social form are
exposed. Bourdieu has pointed out that social networks (even the family)
are ‘not a natural given, or even a social given, constituted once and for all
by an initial act of institution’ (Bourdieu, 1986).
In his ‘Forms of Capital’, Bourdieu implies that social capital is imbri-
cated with the habitus of those constituting the network of social relations.
Margaret Somers points out that this assimilation ‘produces a theory less
about how social connections can be owned, than about how one is more
commonly owned by, that is, possessed by, social capital’ (2008: 226). The
associations of social capital thus act on individuals and provide norms to
be internalized. While Riis also desires an interpellation for those subjects
being created through exposure to bourgeois norms, he calls for a distinct
social institution (or apparatus) ^ the family. Santorum also focuses on the
family, but he looks outside it to what he calls value-transmitting institu-
tions to enable the formation of subjects and social relations, that is, for
him social capital is equally an important determinant of a habitus. For
Santorum these social bonds form identities that can help form families,
while for Riis the family must be protected from these other social relations.
These relations and the reciprocity arising from the bonds form the
crucial first of Santorum’s five pillars of American civilization. He argues
that where the family breaks down, social capital crumbles. Yet, while his
account initially claims that the traditional family undergirds each of these
pillars,32 Santorum appears to reverse the direction of causality with his dis-
cussion of Putnam. Initially, families had to be repaired and nurtured to
build and support social capital. Now he finds that:
we need an abundant store of social capital to create and sustain the kind of
freedom that our founding fathers envisioned, the kind of freedom that pro-
motes the common good and supports families. It’s a freedom requiring a
certain degree of selflessness and virtue. (2005a: 56)
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Social capital creates modes for transmission of values to foster the
family. Strong families are necessary for social capital, but we need the free-
dom which arises from social capital to support families. (A Nietzschean
confusion of cause and effect ^ or perhaps a false causality ^ appears to be
at play here; see Nietzsche, 1968.) He tells us that ‘the place to begin in
building up social capital is with the family’ (2005a: 57), but how then
does the proper form of freedom exist to support the family?
[W]hile the number of Americans who went bowling for recreation was
higher in the 1990s than in the 1950s, the number of Americans participat-
ing in bowling leagues had declined markedly over the same period.
Now, that may sound trivial, but think what that kind of statistic means. A
bowling league is an association; joiningmeans agreeing to change your per-
sonal, individual life ^ for example, by agreeing to show up for games
every Monday night, whether it is convenient or not ^ for the sake of
others, who rely on you to show up.. . .The thing of huge significance to all
Americans is that the decline of bowling leagues is but one of countless
examples revealing that Americans over the past generation have given up
on the habit of joining, the habit of association. Now, we still sometimes go
bowling, but only on our terms, as the fancy strikes us ^ which means we
go bowling alone. Most often, however, we just stay home and watch TV,
alone. We have gone from being a nation of reliable joiners to a nation of
individuals jealously guarding their ‘free time,’ the time when no one has a
claim on them.We are not renewing our social capital. (2005a: 54^5)
The idea of ‘joining’ is entirely at odds with the familial ideals from T˛nnies
to Riis to Wood ^ one does not join a family (excepting by marriage) but
rather is born into it. The family ideal assumes an organic naturalness, and
this organicism is to be the basis of social relations, not the artificial trans-
actions based on capital that require joining.
Santorum’s project of compassionate conservatism ties the interests of
the family to those of civil society, albeit with confusions about how they
relate to and support each other. His insistence on the transcendental struc-
ture and role of the nuclear family requires an obfuscation or elision of the
historical antagonism between the family and civil society; the pleas of com-
passionate conservatism’s predecessor ^ Jacob Riis ^ must remain in obscu-
rity to argue for the mutual fecundation between these two social
structures. To draw together these two forms, despite the historical and the-
oretical tensions between them, Santorum makes a subtle change in his
argument.
Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft and the Family
Santorum calls for the defense of a different institution than Riis. This
family of the new millennium attempts to keep the form of family without
the same internal principles structuring it. Implicit is a sense that there
has been a foreclosure of the sentiment relations of Gemeinschaft ^ it
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becomes irretrievable.The family, which was articulated as its last remnant,
no longer seems to exist; it has to have a new means to bolster it.The exhor-
tations for protection of the family from policy and legislation inserts instru-
mentality into the institution of the family ^ it has become, in T˛nnies’
sense, a Gesellschaft structure. The collapse between the movements of
family values and social capital marks a second acquiescence ^ the family
has been irredeemably changed by modern life. The family of the family
values movement is a shell institution from which the previous content has
been emptied.
As the family itself transforms, Santorum can argue that to restore the
five pillars of capital we must start with the family33 ^ all forms of capital,
he argues, are grounded in the family. He inverts the Riisian claims that
capital (and its social versions) was the cause of family breakdown. He ^
among others ^ reconstitutes the family as a modern political institution;
the means of addressing the anxieties about family values are thus at odds
with the language of family. At the discursive level, the family values move-
ment is a partial rejection of modernity, or at least the impacts of moderni-
zation. With this movement, the older social form of family, or
Gemeinschaft, is to be a bulwark against the onslaught of modernization.34
Whereas the prescription of social capital implicitly recognizes the suffi-
ciency of modernity to solve its own problems ^ a modern social form of
Gesellschaft can be the panacea for social problems. By integrating the
family into the concerns about social capital, Santorum drops the critique
of modernity from the concerns surrounding the family.
Since anxieties about the family are no longer integrated with critiques
of modern civil society, they are able to take up new means for redressing
concerns. Riis’s attempt to bring the countryside to the city and set limits
on capital are not the responses of Santorum ^ he calls for an embrace of
capital. The religious right is very much a political movement and, as such,
grounded in instrumentality. The primarily evangelical movement35 has to
legitimate its decision to shed its centuries-old commitment to a
Troeltschian sectarianism vis-a' -vis the state.36 The de facto withdrawal
from concerns of temporal power has been foresworn through the classic
moves of ressentiment-politics. With the decline of unions and other volun-
tary life, religious institutions remain the sole locus of vibrant social capital.
The religious right has a comparative advantage over its political opponents
because of this in-built infrastructure into which it can tap. Thus, it assimi-
lates social capital to its political goals of ‘family values’, however ambigu-
ously defined.
But the functioning of the religious right is not our concern here. The
assimilation of family values rhetoric to the concerns of social capital signals
a rapprochement between social conservatism and modernity. As economic
shifts push the nation into a globalized, postmodern culture, middle-class
angst no longer harks back to the simple times of Gemeinschaft ideals. It
is too remote a past to be viable; thus, there is an acquiescence to modernity.
The modern family values movement spurns its Victorian roots by
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maintaining the nostalgic language for a life and family of old, built around
a Christian home, while embracing means, institutions and ^ even more
importantly ^ a form of family which belie the nostalgia. The torch-bearers
of the family have transformed the family ideal. Most of the long-time com-
patriots in this cause have abandoned the nostalgia in all but rhetoric,
while embracing the language as a means for political power. The family is
now but a remnant of the social institution which it once was, but this
shrinking has taken place at the hands of its defenders.
American modernization is now not so very new; its problems have
been negotiated for well over a century.The social problems created through
the urbanization of industry ^ once so worrisome to Jacob Riis ^ are no
longer present; de-industrialization and the subsequent loss of urban job
opportunities (and life chances) now loom much larger. Yet, as we have
seen, the basic concerns about modernization’s downsides have continued
into our current political debates. As the industrializing spatial fixes, which
created the extreme growth of the late-19th-century city, began to fracture
with the geographical separation of production and consumption, modern
life irreparably changed. From a loss of inner-city jobs to a culturalization
of politics, the changes in capital and its relationships with the American
city have changed the conditions for the discussions of the modern family.
This movement of family anxieties into the realm of policy is part of a
broader political trend over the last several decades ^ a culturalization of
politics. This process is evident as early as Riis’s invocations of the trope of
Cain. Yet, Riis used cultural means to represent new social conditions not
well understood, while Santorum and others deploy religious themes in a
movement away from discussing urban social problems. In part this trend
was abetted by the geographical removal of much industrial production
from the continental United States.This removal undercut the mobilizations
of labor and exported many of the social problems which come from produc-
tion. Despite these changes in political economy, the elevation of the family
to a policy concern indicates a giant shift in the nature of the anxieties
about the family. The family has now become an institution or association,
which can be sustained through instrumental interventions; it is no longer
the organic sentiment relations remaining from some long-faded
Gemeinschaft. The family and the Christian home ideal which were at the
center of American critiques of modernization have ceased to be.The rhetor-
ical integration of concerns with family values and waning social capital
becomes possible with the disemboweling of the Victorian ideals of the
Christian home. The new contemporary incarnation of the family has
become an empty signifier readily deployed for political means; it has
become a thoroughly modern institution and lost any claim to transcendence
once posited by the late Victorian forebears of the family values movement.
While contemporary debates over family values imply a transcendence
of this social structure, the instrumentality of the policy goals belies it. The
family becomes a social institution supported by tax, policy, judicial and
educational interventions ^ it becomes an institution reproduced through,
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bolstered by and defined by the state. It becomes a state apparatus, while
claims of transcendence legitimate it. Beyond a Horkheimian cultural lag, the
American family values debates and cultural wars of recent decades have
established a cultural drag.37 A cultural drag is a purposive effort to deny
change in order to reify the institution, while simultaneously lauding or
trying to accrue the benefits of the economic shifts. Cultural drag is an effort
to divide cultural politics from political economy.The contemporary debates
about family are not a failure to recognize structures changing through shifts
in means of production and consumption; they are attempts to historically
freeze the family and assert its transcendence, so the seeming benefits of neo-
liberal capital continue to flow, ostensibly with no impact on the social form.
The politicization of the family at the ballot box and in the courthouse,
boardroom and legislative chambers has, over the last decade and a half,
played out with the dual approach of transcendental rhetoric and instrumen-
tal interventions. In Jacob Riis’s Progressive Era, the state’s concerns about
the family focused on the external frameworks necessary to provide the
family with a private space to thrive. The state used zoning laws, building
codes and urban planning to enable the creation of a familial haven from the
heartless world; it literally created the spaces for privacy. In our present
moment, the family values movement calls for the extension of the state
through the virtual walls of privacy to structure what the family itself looks
like (not merely to change the structures which enable the family). A seeming
given of earlier eras ^ families grounded in heteronormative marriage as the
culturally legitimate form of social reproduction ^ is now fought for.
From the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to California’s 2008
ballot initiative Proposition 8 ^ which declared that ‘only marriage between
a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California’ ^ the debates
about family life reach into previously private enclaves. Some states have
struck at the historical familial norms by allowing same-sex marriage or
civil unions, prompting reactions from family values activists with state ref-
erenda and legal challenges. In July 2010 the United States District Court
in Boston struck down the DOMA as unconstitutional, setting the stage
for appeals up to the Supreme Court and an eventual federal ruling on
what constitutes marriage.38 Responding to this ruling, a Senior Fellow at
the Family Research Council reasserts that the current idea of marriage
and family has ‘been around forever’ (Goodnough and Schwartz, 2010); he
maintains the rhetoric of transcendence as the movement readies for con-
tinuing judicial challenges. No longer the Riisian locus of withdrawal from
the world, the family is now a thoroughly public political institution.
Notes
1. For instance, see Santorum (2005a). Like former senator Santorum, I primar-
ily use the popular work of Robert Putnam for my discussions of social capital.
2. Focus on the Family was founded in 1977 by psychologist and family counselor
James Dobson. Dobson was also involved in setting up theWashington, DC-based
116 Theory, Culture & Society 28(4)
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016tcs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
FamilyResearchCouncil in1983; itsfirsttwodirectors^GerryRegierandGaryBauer
^ were formerReagan administrationofficials.
3. See the appendix in Putnam (2000), charting the rise of prominent associa-
tions and clubs.
4. Putnam is not the first to discuss social capital but was the primary force
behind its popularization. Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and others wrote on
social capital before Putnam. For example, see Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (2000).
5. American involvement with voluntary associations has waxed and waned.
However, I am not positing the demise of civil society; rather, I am analyzing
how concerns for social capital have been assimilated to those of family values.
For instance, former Senator Rick Santorum considers the nation’s civic structures
to be at a critical point. ‘In many respects, the problems we now face represent a
more complex challenge, because almost all aspects of our civilization seem to be
at tipping points. The good news is that capital can be replenished’ (Santorum,
2005a: 12).
6. In her recent, critical treatment of social capital, Margaret Somers juxtaposes it
with civil society. In an ahistorical manner, she considers civil society to be a
social sphere exempt from the characteristics of contractualism associated with
social capital. However, Somers’ own recitation of the history of the concept of
civil society, from Locke, through Hegel, Marx and others, acknowledges that it
has long been regarded as having a contractual/transactional nature. For most of
the history of the concept, civil society is the contractual form of the social juxta-
posed to the non-contractual idea of community. She reifies a brief 20th-century
version of civil society conceived as non-contractual as the basic characteristic of
the concept and thus erroneously juxtaposes it to social capital, which is its cur-
rent incarnation (see Somers, 2008).
7. ‘[NewYork] has often sadly missed a Napoleon III, to clean up and make light
in the dark corners’ (Riis, 1997: 199). In the early 1850s, Baron Haussmann was
commissioned by Napoleon III to modernize Paris. He built large avenues and
shopping districts. In part, the goal was to break up the poor, working-class neigh-
borhoods in which the uprisings of 1848 began.The wider streets would both facil-
itate troop movements and make barricade-building more di⁄cult for those
hoping to start future uprisings. The changes implemented by Haussmann trans-
formed the urban landscape and scattered the poor from the previously over-
crowded, labyrinthine neighborhoods to build the modern, bourgeois Paris of
wide avenues and open spaces.
8. For example, inRiis: ‘Clearly there is reason for the sharp attention given at last to
the life and the doings of the other half, too long unconsidered. Philanthropy we call
it sometimeswithpatronizingairs. Bettercall it self-defence’ (1970:1^2).
9. To quote Riis (1997: 5):
Long ago it was said that ‘one half of the world does not know how the
other half lives.’ That was true then. It did not know because it did
not care. The half that was on top cared little for the struggles, and
less for the fate of those who were underneath, so long as it was able to
hold them there and keep its own seat.There came a time when the dis-
comfort and crowding below were so great, and the consequent upheavals
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so violent, that it was no longer an easy thing to do, and then the upper
half fell to inquiring what was the matter. Information on the subject
has been accumulating rapidly since, and the whole world has had its
hands full answering for its old ignorance.
10. For instance, see Riis (1903: 130, 1997: chs 24 and 25, et al.).
11. For more on the importance of order to Progressive Era reformers seeWiebe
(1967).
12. Karl Marx calls these the catchphrases of the old society.They were the slogan
for the conservative alliance formed between Catholic and monarchist elements
in 1848 France; this group was sometimes called the Party of Order (see Marx,
1974: 155). Louis Bonaparte and his reactionary program of order, such as
Haussmannization, were lauded by Jacob Riis as a model for how to respond to
the problems of urbanization.
13. Writing on a different context but similar time period to Riis, subalternist
Partha Chatterjee (1999) outlines how the modern outer/inner distinction took
on a material/spiritual overlay in the Bengali colonial context. Colonial nationalist
writers, according to Chatterjee, argued that Europeans failed to colonize the
inner, spiritual realm. Riis is making a similar argument for the Christian home
^ it should be a domain unable to be reached from the ravages of urbanizing
capital.
14. Colleen McDannell, who has undertaken several studies of the Christian
home, describes its central importance as a social institution.
During the nineteenth century, good family life was seen as the means
by which the nation and its religion were maintained. Americans
believed the home to be the nursery of both patriotism and piety.
Home life taught the mutual dependence and reciprocal responsibility
of each citizen. By connecting the individual to the community at
large, the family instilled notions of morality, order, stability, educa-
tion, purity, refinement, and discipline. Although the church also
played an important role in creating good Christians, the Victorian pre-
occupation with the family saw home life as the more crucial purveyor
of ethics and piety. (1992: 164)
15. The category of the nuclear family first appears in the mid-century work of
anthropologist George Peter Murdock (see Murdock, 1949).
16. To quote Riis (1903: 50):
They are many and complex in the setting forth of them, I suspect: the
hurry of our modern life, the new freedom that makes little minds
think themselves bigger than their maker, the de-moralization of the
public school, the pressure of business, ^ it is hard to get the family
together ^ which is merely setting up the fact of the scattering of the
home in the defense of it. The causes are many, but the result is one:
the wreck of the home.
17. First, the Cain story is the first place where family devotions and an altar are
established. Second, popular commentaries of the 18th and 19th centuries, for
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example, Matthew Henry’s Commentary (Henry, 2008), relate Cain’s actions to
shunning of the family and the altar.
18. For more on the significance of Cain for Riis and other Progressive Era refor-
mers, seeWebb (2007).
19. For instance, in his most famous book, How the Other Half Lives, Riis opens
his analysis of the Other Half (after a brief introduction) with a discussion of the
origin of the tenement. He writes that ‘[t]he first tenement New York knew bore
the mark of Cain from its birth’ (1997: 9).
20. For instance, Robert Putnam erroneously equates social capital with commu-
nity. ‘Sometimes ‘‘social capital,’’ like its conceptual cousin ‘‘community,’’ sounds
warm and cuddly’ (2000: 21).
21. In Capital volume 3, Marx (1993) analyzes the social character of capital in
which these social relations both enable production and result from it.
22. This model implicitly assumes theAristotelian family as a household economic
unit that facilitates domestic interactions with society.The family of Riis and other
reformers is amodern bourgeois family, which is a repository of affect and seemingly
unrelated to and independent of processes of production.The contemporary incarna-
tion of the family in the family values movement maintains the Riisian rhetoric of
affect,while returning to contractual, transactionalmodels of familial norms.
23. He continues:
[t]he spirit of kinship is certainly not limited by the walls of the house
or by mere physical proximity. Wherever it is strong and lively in the
most intimate relationships, it can find its own nourishment, feeding
upon past memories and recalling close-knit communal activity, how-
ever far it may be from home. In such circumstances we cleave to phys-
ical closeness all the more, because only in this way can our longing
for love find rest and harmony. The ordinary man, in the long term
and for the most part, will feel at his best and happiest when he is sur-
rounded by his family and his own circle. He is at home (chez soi).
(T˛nnies, 2001: 28)
24. The rise of the modern city is closely tied with a series of demands of capital for
spatial fixes. Urbanization consolidated different functions within close proximity;
the consolidation of labor, production, distribution, consumption and finance
within a circumscribed space increased the efficiencies of capital and thus produced
a boom of industrial cities with an overaccumulation of labor to enable wages to
remain low. For more on the urbanization of capital, see Harvey (1989).
25. Wood explains these distinctions thus:
In the category of interest relations the selection of contacts is made
from the point of view of the service the relations may render toward
the realization of some dominant interest; thus such relations are
means to other ends rather than ends in themselves. For example, con-
siderations of personality, group membership, and social status are of
secondary importance in business relations, relations between
employer and employee, lawyer and client, and so forth. On the other
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hand, relations in which sentiment takes the place of calculation are
ends in themselves. They comprise the great number of relationships
in which the satisfaction of the desire for affectionate response is the
main purpose.They are characterized by intimacy, mutual attachment,
and sympathy. Such, for example, are the relationships established in
acquaintance, friendship, and love. (1960: 10)
26. Abel steers slightly aside from entirely mapping sentiment relations onto
Gemeinschaft by arguing that he grounds them in a ‘consciousness of kind’ rather
than T˛nnies’Wesenswille. For our purposes, however, this distinction is irrelevant.
First,Wooddoes notgo into it ^ shedoesnot evenmentionT˛nnies. Second, it is these
basic social relations and not their grounding which is crucial toWood’s analysis.
Abel acknowledges that thebasicdistinctions in these relations are thoseof T˛nnies.
27. As we have noted, Jacob Riis entitled his autobiography The Making of an
American.
28. His ‘five pillars of American civilization’ are social capital, economic capital,
moral capital, cultural capital and intellectual capital (Santorum, 2005a: 10).
29. According to Simone (2001: 49^50):
Households, extended families, social networks or neighbourhoods are
increasingly uncertain as to what is constraining their life chances, and,
as a result, they must pay attention to other realities, with which they
once co-existed only at a ‘distance’. But as these realities are increasingly
viewed as salient there may be concomitant narrowing of the field of
social affiliation, loyalty, trust and co-operation. Different groups oper-
ating in close proximity are often forced to become competitors in what
are, for the most part, shrinking economies and public domains.
30. In The Peril and Preservation of the Home, Riis tells of meeting with a
‘respectable Christian’ garment business owner who explains that his business
plan is predicated upon a policy of alienation.The owner presents his plan for divi-
sion of labor not for purposes of efficiency but for the purpose of exploiting
worker ignorance to keep wages down and to prevent worker attrition. He pur-
posely requires that each sewer have one specialty and makes sure that his
sewers do not know each other ^ the garment sections are sewed in homes, so
the workers do not come together in a factory. Thus, no one knows the entire pro-
cess of assembling a garment, and he, thus, protects his interest by ensuring that
the employees cannot leave him to make garments on their own (Riis, 1903).
31. American sociologist Robert Merton distinguishes between a strong and
weak anomie ^ acute or simple in his terms. The weak is ‘the state of confusion
in a group or society which is subject to conflict between value-systems, resulting
in some degree of uneasiness and a sense of separation from the group’, while
the acute is a ‘deterioration and, at the extreme, the disintegration of value-sys-
tems, which results in marked anxieties’ (1963: 163). The social conditions about
which Riis is writing definitely fall into the latter category.
32. For instance, see Santorum (2005a: 10) quoted above.
33. ‘It will come as no surprise that I believe the place to start in restoring these
pillars of our society is with the family ^ because the family is at the center of
all the types of capital I’ve just described’ (Santorum, 2005a: 12).
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34. Of course, despite the transcendental claims posited by the family values
movement, the nuclear family is also a historical form which arose with the
bourgeoisie.
35. Senator Santorum represents the social conservativism alliance between evan-
gelicals and Catholics. With long-standing traditions of subsidiarity from
Catholic social teaching, the Catholic Church is easily integrated into a concern
with civil society.
36. The German liberal Protestant thinker Ernst Troeltsch wrote at the turn of
the last century about sectarianism as a relationship of a church to broader society
(see Troeltsch, 1992). Sects were those religious groups which had thought that
the dominant church groups were in some way corrupt or diminished in their
accommodation of broader society. They usually had an element of withdrawing
from broader political and civil life and were strong advocates of a staunch
church/state separation.
37. Max Horkheimer’s analysis of family looks not only to the immediate impact
of production on social forms but how cultural forms, like family, remain con-
nected to older modes and thus lag in changing to reflect current economic cir-
cumstances. Because of this cultural lag, these slower-changing institutions, like
the family, can sustain a form and rhetoric that reflects older economic conditions
(Horkheimer, 1999).
38. I do not mean to conflate marriage and family here. I cite this example
because it is where the family values movement has focused recent political
efforts. The Supreme Court has, of course, in earlier cases made rulings about
marriage and family. For instance, in 1967’s Loving v. Virginia, the court ended
anti-miscegenation laws, allowing mixed-race marriages and families. And in
Turner v. Safley in 1987, the Court extended the right to marry by striking down
a law requiring prison inmates to have the permission of a warden to marry. In
this latter case, the court spelled out a number of reasons for marriage but did
not address the question of family composition ^ a question most likely to be
addressed after an appeal of the recent US District Court ruling on DOMA.
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